Spatial dependence through local yardstick competition:: Theory and testing
Authors:
- Roger Bivand,
- Stefan Szymanski
Abstract
We propose a model of contracting for natural monopolies in which yardstick evaluation of performance can be optimal. Where principals have partially unobservable objective functions and agents are risk averse an externality is generated which can be observed in patterns of spatial dependence. Imposing standard contracting rules on principals can eliminate the externality and spatial dependence. We test this prediction using spatial econometrics on UK data covering a regime shift from independent contracting to compulsory competitive tendering rules.
- Record ID
- UAM322369b2d7ba45a9b8d4822bb5e8b4dc
- Author
- Journal series
- Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765
- Issue year
- 1997
- Vol
- 55
- Pages
- 257-265
- ASJC Classification
- ;
- DOI
- DOI:10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00077-3 Opening in a new tab
- Language
- (en) English
- Score (nominal)
- 0
- Score source
- journalList
- Publication indicators
- = 46; : 1999 = 0.607; : 2006 (2 years) = 0.366 - 2007 (5 years) =0.467
Share
- Uniform Resource Identifier
- https://researchportal.amu.edu.pl/info/article/UAM322369b2d7ba45a9b8d4822bb5e8b4dc/
- URN
urn:amu-prod:UAM322369b2d7ba45a9b8d4822bb5e8b4dc
* presented citation count is obtained through Internet information analysis and it is close to the number calculated by the Publish or PerishOpening in a new tab system.