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The conscious vs. the intentional stance. Folk psychology strategies in attributing conscious states to other persons

Michał Wyrwa

Abstract

The topic of this work is an attempt to answer the question of whether attributing conscious mental states to others consists of attributing phenomenal states to them. For many scholars of consciousness, the basic type of consciousness is phenomenal consciousness, which is supposed to be both obvious and graspable by the each person. This view was never subjected to an exhaustive empirical examination: while sparse studies that were performed focused on attributions of phenomenal states, their validity raises concerns. The aim of the linguistic and questionnaire research reported here was to test the fundamental assumptions of the phenomenal reading of consciousness: the phenomenal and the obviousness claims. The outcomes indicate that laypersons do not share this phenomenal view with experts, and corroborate the validity concerns regarding earlier studies on the subject. What is, then, the folk view about consciousness? The author postulates replacing the phenomenal stance, tendency to attribute phenomenal stance to others, with a more broadly understood conscious stance, according to which we attribute consciousness to others to predict their future mental states.
Record ID
UAM732c3599c0c347388c992f782eac513b
Diploma type
Doctor of Philosophy
Author
Title in Polish
Nastawienie świadomościowe a nastawienie intencjonalne. Strategie rozpoznawania cudzych stanów świadomych w psychologii potocznej
Title in English
The conscious vs. the intentional stance. Folk psychology strategies in attributing conscious states to other persons
Language
eng (en) English
Certifying Unit
Wydział Psychologii i Kognitywistyki [nowa struktura organizacyjna] (SNs/WPiK)
Scientific discipline (2.0)
5.11 psychology
Year of creation
2021
Start date
2018
Defense Date
08-02-2021
Title date
08-02-2021
Supervisor
Andrzej Klawiter Andrzej Klawiter,, Wydział Psychologii i Kognitywistyki [nowa struktura organizacyjna] (SNs/WPiK)Szkoła Nauk Społecznych [nowa struktura organizacyjna] (SNs)
Pages
198
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10593/26036 Opening in a new tab
Keywords in English
phenomenal consciousness; folk psychology; philosophy of consciousness; experimental philosophy; cognitive science
Abstract in English
The topic of this work is an attempt to answer the question of whether attributing conscious mental states to others consists of attributing phenomenal states to them. For many scholars of consciousness, the basic type of consciousness is phenomenal consciousness, which is supposed to be both obvious and graspable by the each person. This view was never subjected to an exhaustive empirical examination: while sparse studies that were performed focused on attributions of phenomenal states, their validity raises concerns. The aim of the linguistic and questionnaire research reported here was to test the fundamental assumptions of the phenomenal reading of consciousness: the phenomenal and the obviousness claims. The outcomes indicate that laypersons do not share this phenomenal view with experts, and corroborate the validity concerns regarding earlier studies on the subject. What is, then, the folk view about consciousness? The author postulates replacing the phenomenal stance, tendency to attribute phenomenal stance to others, with a more broadly understood conscious stance, according to which we attribute consciousness to others to predict their future mental states.

Uniform Resource Identifier
https://researchportal.amu.edu.pl/info/phd/UAM732c3599c0c347388c992f782eac513b/
URN
urn:amu-prod:UAM732c3599c0c347388c992f782eac513b

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